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States (see, for example, Mishkin [1999] and Goodfriend [2005]).
What, if anything, would an inﬂation target change about the way
the Federal Reserve makes monetary policy? To answer this question, one
must be explicit about the strategy used to achieve that target. Such a strategy
might not even include inﬂation as an operational target. An answer to this
question therefore requires speciﬁcation of a policy rule—an explicit formu-
lationoftheobjectivesofmonetarypolicyandthestrategyforachievingthose
objectives.
A policy rule would clarify what, if anything, an explicit inﬂation tar-
get implies about other objectives. Are real output and unemployment also
objectives? If a tradeoff between ﬂuctuations of inﬂation around its target
and ﬂuctuations of real output around potential or trend output exists, real
output and unemployment must be included as objectives along with inﬂa-
tion. Whether this tradeoff exists depends upon the structure of the economy.
Therefore, to evaluate the prospective working of an inﬂation target requires
explicitspeciﬁcationofbothapolicyruleandamodeloftheeconomy. Differ-
ent models possess different implications for how a central bank would make
an inﬂation target operational. How does one choose such a model?
Therearetwodifferentframeworksforexplaininghowcentralbankscon-
trolinﬂation. Oneframeworkmakesan“exploitable”Phillipscurvethecentral
behavioral relationship in the control of inﬂation. That is, the central bank
can use the real-nominal (unemployment-inﬂation) correlations in the empir-
ical data as a reliable lever with which to trade off between these variables.
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The other tradition, the quantity theory, makes monetary control the central
behavioral relationship. That is, to control inﬂation, the central bank must
control the rate at which nominal money grows relative to real money demand
by the public. The former tradition, but not the latter, implies that the control
of inﬂation imposes a tradeoff between variability in real output and inﬂation.
Two problems arise in choosing the correct model. The ﬁrst is the lack
of consensus over the empirical generalizations that should serve as a basis
for choosing one model over the other. What lessons does one draw from the
recenthistoricalexperienceintheUnitedStatesofrisinginﬂationfollowedby
disinﬂation? How does one summarize this experience in a way that allows a
choice between competing models?
Section 1 lists four empirical and theoretical generalizations that I con-
sider consistent with this experience and with the quantity theory framework.
Section 2 discusses the consensus that exists over these generalizations. (The
central bank must provide a nominal anchor.) Section 3 discusses the dis-
agreement. (What is the nature of the Phillips curve?)
Thesecondproblemisthatnoexpositionofamodelinthequantitytheory
tradition exists that is useful for explaining monetary control applicable to a
central bank that uses an interest rate instrument. The central insight of the
quantity theory is that the nominal quantity of money can change without
a prior change in real money demand. When it does, the price level must
changetorestoretherealquantityofmoneydemandedbythepublic(Friedman
1969).1 However, existing expositions of the quantity theory assume that the
central bank employs a money target. They leave unclear how a central bank,




model simulation that highlights periods when the central bank does and does
not achieve its inﬂation target. The ﬁnal section explains how an inﬂation
target increases the demands placed on a central bank to communicate clearly
to the public.
1. FOUR QUANTITY THEORY GENERALIZATIONS
The current monetary standard did not emerge as an explicit choice among
alternativepolicyruleswithclearlydeﬁnednominalanchors. Nevertheless,its
adoption occurred as part of the debate engendered by the intellectual ferment
that accompanied the 1970s stagﬂation. Two sets of ideas came together to
1 Hetzel (2004a), which places the monetary policy of the Fed in a quantity theoretic frame-
work, is complementary to this article. Goodfriend (forthcoming) and Nelson (2003) offer alterna-
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provide the intellectual basis for the new standard. One set derived from the
quantity theory, a tradition as old as the discipline of economics.2 The other
set, the rational expectations revolution, was new.3 The quantity theory, with
its fundamental distinction between nominal and real variables, explained the
need for a nominal anchor that only a central bank could provide. Rational
expectations, which emphasized the importance of policy rules in the forma-
tion of expectations, explained the importance of a credible rule. A model
useful for explaining how central banks control inﬂation will incorporate four
generalizations shaped by these two sets of ideas.
First, the price system works well to clear markets. Conceptually, a mon-
etary economy possesses a real business cycle core that would emerge with
complete ﬂexibility of the price level (Kydland and Prescott 1982; Prescott
1986). Allowed to operate in an unhindered fashion, the price system embod-
ied in this core allocates resources efﬁciently. Auseful conceptual benchmark
for assessing monetary policy is the difference between the values of real
variables and their “natural” values represented by equilibrium in this real
core.
Second, individual welfare depends upon real variables (real quantities
andrelativeprices),notnominalmagnitudes(dollaramounts). Forthisreason,
only the central bank can give ﬁat money (a nominal variable) a well-deﬁned
value. The way that it does so determines the nature of the nominal anchor
and the monetary standard.
An implication of the ﬁrst and second generalizations is that central banks
control the price level through their control of nominal money relative to real
money demand. The price level is a price—the money price of goods. The
assumptionthatthepricesystemworksmeansthatthepricelevelvariestoclear
the market for the quantity of money.4 That is, it varies to endow the nominal
quantityofmoneywiththerealquantityofmoney(purchasingpower)desired
by the public.5 In this sense, the price level is a monetary phenomenon.
Third, individuals use information efﬁciently (form their expectations
rationally). Thisgeneralization, plusthemonetarycharacterofthepricelevel,
implies that individuals base their expectation of the future price level on the
systematic, predictable part of monetary policy (Lucas [1972] 1981). Be-
2 Expositions of the quantity theory go back to David Hume ([1752] 1955). The most recent
expositions are Friedman (1969, 1974). Friedman (1989) summarizes these earlier expositions. See
also Brunner (1971).
3 See Lucas ([1972] 1981; [1973] 1981) and Sargent ([1971] 1981).
4 The equilibrating role played by the price level changes with ﬁxed, rather than ﬂoating,
exchange rates. In the former case, the price level varies to equilibrate the balance of payments.
The nominal anchor is the foreign price level. Through the balance of payments, nominal money
adjusts to provide the real money desired by the public.
5 The real quantity of money possesses a well-deﬁned value—the natural value associated with
complete price ﬂexibility. This value is not unique but varies with the cost of holding money (the
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cause individuals’welfare depends upon their ability to distinguish real from
nominal changes (an absence of money illusion), they will use the systematic
part of monetary policy to forecast inﬂation. Of course, the central bank can
render this task difﬁcult by following a rule that yields unpredictable changes
in prices.
Given that individuals base their expectations and behavior on the sys-
tematic part of the central bank’s actions, it follows that achievement of an
inﬂation target (any nominal equilibrium) requires a monetary rule—a con-
sistent procedure by the central bank for pursuing the target (Lucas [1980]
1981). If the central bank does not target money directly, this rule must tie
down the expected future value of money (the inverse of the price level, the
goods price of money). Stated alternatively, in a ﬁat money regime, money,
which is intrinsically worthless, possesses value because individuals expect it
to possess value in the future. Individuals part with goods for money today
only because they believe that others will accept goods for money tomorrow.
The central bank must provide a nominal anchor that determines how the pub-
lic forms an expectation of the future price level. To do so requires the central
bank to behave in a consistent, predictable manner, that is, to follow a policy
rule.
It also follows that the rule determining the price level will possess a
characterization in terms of monetary control (control of a nominal variable,
money) rather than control of output or unemployment (real variables). If
the welfare of individuals depends upon real—not nominal—variables, and
they form their expectations of inﬂation conformably with the monetary rule,




central bank use these correlations to inﬂuence predictably the behavior of the
public? Canitsystematicallymanipulateunemploymenttocontrolinﬂation—
or manipulate inﬂation to control unemployment—or trade off between the
two by increasing the variability of one to reduce the variability of the other?6
To make the importance of a rule concrete, note that the FOMC controls
only an overnight interest rate—the funds rate. A stabilizing response of the
yield curve to a real shock requires a widely understood, credible rule. Con-
sider a persistent, positive shock. Credibility for price stability means that
the public assumes that the central bank will raise the funds rate by what-
6 Milton Friedman (1968, 1977) and Robert Lucas ([1972] 1981; [1973] 1981; and 1996)
argued that the real-nominal correlations summarized by Phillips curves represent a reduced form
rather than a structural relationship. That is, these correlations are not invariant to the monetary
rule. If the central bank attempted to “exploit” them to control unemployment, they would disap-
pear. Similarly, they would disappear if the central bank attempted either to control inﬂation by
manipulating unemployment or to control the joint variability of unemployment and inﬂation.R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 49
ever amount necessary to maintain price stability. With credibility, the entire
upward shift in the yield curve will reﬂect higher expected future real rates
of interest, not higher inﬂation. Conversely, with a persistent, negative real
shock, credibility implies that the entire downward shift in the yield curve be
real. Thecentralbankgainsnothingbyattemptingtooffsetthenegativeshock
with inﬂation. Pursued as a systematic policy, the public will anticipate such
behavior, and the expectation of inﬂation will offset the stimulative effect of
the increased inﬂation.
ThefourthandﬁnalgeneralizationthatItakeassummarizingthequantity
theory is that there is a fundamental difference between a relative price and
the price level, which is an average of individual dollar prices. The price
system decentralizes the information required to discover equilibrium relative
prices (Hayek 1945) but does not do so for the price level. Price setters
require some common coordinating device for changing their dollar prices
that collectively allows the price level to change in a way that is compatible
with the monetary policy rule and that avoids undesirable changes in relative
prices. That coordinating device is a common expectation of inﬂation. It
functions well only when the policy rule makes changes in the price level
predictable.
Monetary nonneutrality arises when price setters lack a common expecta-
tional compass that provides for the coordination of the change in all dollar
prices required by the policy rule.7 Consider a policy that engenders mon-
etary contraction requiring unpredictable reductions in the price level. Those
reductions take place only through a discovery process—occurring without
this coordination—by individual ﬁrms. The ﬁrm that moves ﬁrst to lower its
price faces the problem of strategic interaction with competitors.8 There is a
7 This explanation is in the misinformational spirit of Lucas ([1972] 1981) rather than the
sticky-price spirit of Calvo (1983). Consider two ﬁrms, i = 1,2. A ﬁrm will change ˆ pi, its dollar
price, by an amount, ˆ ri, equal to the desired change in relative price, plus ˆ pe
i , the expected change
in the price level:
ˆ pi =ˆ ri +ˆ pe
i . (1)
The monetary policy rule will be consistent with some change in price level ˆ p. However,
if that rule is only imperfectly known to ﬁrms, they will expect a change in the price level
ˆ pe
i =ˆ p + µi. The actual inﬂation rate ˆ pmwill then differ from ˆ p:
ˆ pm =ˆ p + ω1µ1 + ω2µ2, (2)
where ωi is the expenditure share of ﬁrm i.
If the central bank announces an inﬂation target ˆ pT and follows a policy rule consistent with
that target, actual inﬂation will equal the inﬂation rate consistent with the rule and both will equal
the inﬂation target ( ˆ pm =ˆ p =ˆ pT ). In contrast, if the central bank behaves in a way that makes
the inﬂation rate unpredictable, it will create relative price distortions that affect real variables.
That is, as shown in (2), the behavior of relative prices will not wash out, but will instead affect
inﬂation.
8 Prices are sticky in the sense that this ﬁrm must change its price under the assumption
that its competitors will not change their prices. Ball and Romer (1991) capture this strategic
interaction through a multiplicity of equilibria.50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
positive externality to lowering one’s price ﬁrst that the individual ﬁrm does
not capture.9
2. THE CENTRAL BANK SHOULD CONTROL INFLATION
A consensus now exists that the central bank determines trend inﬂation and
must provide a nominal anchor. That consensus derives from the results of
the different policy rules followed by the Fed before and after 1980. Before
1980, monetary policy did not provide a nominal anchor.10 Policymakers
basedpolicyontheassumptionthatinﬂationwasanonmonetaryphenomenon;
that is, inﬂation possessed many sources unrelated to the degree to which
central bank procedures provided for monetary control. Consequently, the
policy appropriate for the control of inﬂation depended upon the source of
the inﬂation. Especially, cost-push inﬂation was better dealt with through
incomespoliciesthanthrougharestrictionofaggregatedemand,whichwould
raise unemployment.11 Incomes policies ranged from occasional government
interference in price setting in particular markets to full-scale wage and price
controls.
Universally, policies for the control of inﬂation based on incomes policies
failed. Bydefault,attheendofthe1970s,governmentsturnedtocentralbanks
exclusively to control inﬂation. Because central banks are the organization
with a monopoly on the monetary base, that decision vindicated Friedman’s
hypothesisthatinﬂationisalwaysandeverywhereamonetaryphenomenon.12
The experiment created a consensus that the central bank must provide a
nominal anchor.13
9 The externality comes from increasing the real quantity of money toward the amount de-
manded by individuals collectively.
10 In the 1970s, through a continuing inﬂuence on expectations, the long historical experience
with a commodity standard provided a nominal anchor. However, that inﬂuence disappeared by
1980.
11 See Hetzel (1998, 2004a) for references.
12 Friedman based his hypothesis on the empirical observation that high money growth
accompanies high inﬂation. Once a central bank succeeds in restoring price stability, however,
money loses its ability to predict prices. The apparent disappearance of money as a useful predic-
tor obscures the validity of the Friedman hypothesis. I interpret the statement that inﬂation is a
monetary phenomenon as follows: First, the central bank must supply the nominal anchor (provide
for nominal determinacy). Second, different monetary policy rules determine different time series
behavior of the price level. Third, the trend rate of inﬂation is under the complete control of the
central bank. Note that the hypothesis does not imply that for a given rule real shocks exercise
no inﬂuence on the price level.
13 Bernanke (2005) reviewed a similar Latin American experiment. The structuralist theory
of development attributed inﬂation to nonmonetary factors such as competition among groups for
incompatibly large shares of national income. Policies based on such ideas led to high rates of
inﬂation. Not until the end of the 1990s, when governments assigned responsibility for inﬂation
to central banks, did Latin American countries achieve low inﬂation.R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 51
3. HOW DOES THE CENTRAL BANK CONTROL INFLATION?
Although there is a consensus that the central bank should control inﬂation,
there is no consensus over how it does so. If the above quantity theory gener-
alizations are correct, then central banks control inﬂation through procedures
that provide for monetary control. The alternative is that they control inﬂation
through manipulation of the unemployment rate according to a Phillips curve
relationship. At issue is the nature of the Phillips curve and whether it offers
a reliable lever for manipulating the behavior of the public.
EconomistshavesuggestedmanypossiblePhillipscurves.14 Lucas([1972]
1981) suggested the New Classical Phillips curve, and Calvo (1983) and
Rotemberg (1987) suggested the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Each ex-
plain some aspects of the pre-1980 and post-1980 change in the monetary
policy rule.15
The New Classical Phillips curve makes output ﬂuctuations (deviations
of real variables from their natural values) a function of forecast errors for
inﬂation. Fluctuations in real variables are generated by the unpredictable
component of monetary policy. Assuming that individuals form their ex-
pectations of inﬂation in a way that incorporates the systematic part of the
monetary policy rule, the central bank cannot predictably manipulate nominal
variables(inﬂation)tocontrolrealvariables(anoutputgaporunemployment).
Conversely, the central bank cannot manipulate these real variables to control
inﬂation. The reason is that a systematic attempt to exploit the real-nominal
correlations present in the data would make them disappear.
Stated another way, an implication of the New Classical Phillips curve
is that the inﬂation-unemployment correlations in the data will not survive
changes in the monetary policy rule (Friedman 1968; Sargent [1971] 1981;
Lucas [1972] 1981, [1973] 1981). As predicted, in the 1970s, the negative
correlation between unemployment and inﬂation disappeared in the face of
sustained inﬂation. Furthermore, in the post-1980 period, in stabilizing in-
ﬂation, monetary policy not only reduced inﬂation, but also maintained it
without unemployment above its natural level. Moreover, both the variability
ofoutputandinﬂationfell. OrphanidesandvanNorden(2004)ﬁndparameter
instability in a variety of Phillips curves estimated over the intervals 1969 to
1982 and 1984 to 2002. This evidence of structural instability runs counter
to formulations of the Phillips curve that offer the policymaker a predictable
tradeoff between inﬂation and unemployment. Examples are the original per-
manent trade-off formulation of Samuelson and Solow (1960) or the later
NAIRU formulation of Modigliani and Papademos (1975).
14 See McCallum (2002, footnote 38) for a long list.
15 The former is used in ﬂexible price rational-expectations natural-rate models (see Sargent
and Wallace [1975]). The latter is used in sticky price New Keynesian models. See Goodfriend
and King (1997), who use the term New Neoclassical Synthesis.52 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
An alternative to the New Classical Phillips curve is the New Keynesian
Phillips curve shown in (3).16 Like the New Classical Phillips curve, it makes
expected inﬂation central. Contemporaneous inﬂation, πt, depends upon ex-
pected future inﬂation, πe
t+1, and a real variable measuring the intensity of
resource utilization. In a world of monopolistic competition, the latter could
bethemarkup(priceovermarginalcost)relativetoitsproﬁt-maximizing(nat-
ural) value (Goodfriend 2004a). Alternatively, it could be an output gap (the
difference between output, yt, and the natural or potential level of output, y∗
t ).
Theoutputgapmeasurestheextenttowhichpricerigiditiesproducevariations
in labor supply that move output away from its natural (ﬂexible price) value
(King and Wolman 1999):
πt = πe
t+1 + b(yt − y∗
t ). (3)
This Phillips curve contrasts with the traditional Keynesian Phillips curve
(4),whereinﬂationdependsuponlaggedinﬂation,anoutputgapthatmeasures
idle(unemployed)resources, andaninﬂationshock, εt. Equation(4)captures
the view that inﬂation shocks (changes in relative prices that pass through to
the price level) initiate inﬂation. The lagged inﬂation term πt−1 expresses
a structural persistence in inﬂation that exists independently of whether the
monetary policy rule accommodates (propagates) the impact of relative price
shocks on the price level.17 With (4), in response to, say, a positive inﬂation
shock εt, the central bank creates a negative output gap (yt − y∗
t ) to limit
the increase in inﬂation. In a model of sticky prices, a Phillips curve like (4)
requires that the central bank increase output variability to reduce inﬂation
variability:18
πt = πt−1 + b(yt − y∗
t ) + εt. (4)
The expectational Phillips curve (3) expresses the importance of credi-
bility in controlling inﬂation. That is, in the post-1989 period, the Fed has
stabilized actual inﬂation by stabilizing expected inﬂation. FOMC behavior
during inﬂation scares provides evidence that the policy rule that provided
a nominal anchor in the post-1980 period entailed a consistent effort to sta-
bilize expected inﬂation at a low level (Goodfriend 1993, 2004b, and 2005;
Goodfriend and King 2004; and Hetzel 2005). For example, during the 1984
16 One reason economists turned to the New Keynesian Phillips curve is that the New Clas-
sical Phillips curve does not explain why monetary shocks impact output and employment before
inﬂation. For a derivation of (3), see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
17 That is, given the structure of the economy assumed in (3) but not (4), in empirical
estimation, lagged inﬂation terms would appear only to that extent that the monetary rule makes
them useful for predicting inﬂation (Sargent 1971).
18 Based on a Phillips curve like (4), Ball (1999, Figure 3.1) and Rudebusch and Svensson
(1999, Figure 5.2) present model-based estimates of a tradeoff between the standard deviation of
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inﬂation scare, characterized by a sharp rise in bond rates, the FOMC raised
the funds rate despite falling actual inﬂation and a negative output gap.
Before 1980, the idea of an expectational nominal anchor would have
seemed implausible. The popular consensus, formed by Keynesians and busi-
nessmen, held that powerful private sector forces (weather, the OPEC cartel,
oligopolistic market structure, militant labor unions, etc.) and government
deﬁcits and regulation powered inﬂation. Expectations unmoored by mone-
tary policy also drove inﬂation (the wage-price spiral). Only a high rate of
unemployment could counter these real forces.19
The Volcker disinﬂation and its aftermath changed attitudes in two re-
spects. Thereductionofinﬂationfromdoubledigitsto4percentdemonstrated
that central banks could control inﬂation. Just as important was the aftermath
when monetary policy maintained moderate inﬂation without either sustained
highunemploymentorperiodicrecoursetohighunemployment. Aconsensus
then emerged that credibility was paramount for central bank control of inﬂa-
tion. A credible monetary policy can always and everywhere control inﬂation
without resorting to high unemployment.20
Credibility or its absence can explain the failure of Phillips curves like
(4) to explain particular episodes. Despite extreme tightness in labor markets
and a positive output gap in 1999 and early 2000, inﬂation remained low.
This episode was the converse of the early 1970s experience where inﬂation
remained high despite an apparent negative output gap. Credibility in the ﬁrst
episode and in its absence in the second can explain this behavior.
Another kind of evidence in favor of an expectational Phillips curve like
(3) is the failure of relative price shocks to exercise a persistent inﬂuence on
inﬂation when the central bank possesses credibility.21 Relative price shocks
do occasionally pass through to the price level.22 With credibility, however,
a positive, relative price shock, for example, that passes through to the price
19 This view still appears in the Phillips curve (4), where inﬂation shocks initiate inﬂation
and intractable inﬂation persistence propagates them. To maintain expected inﬂation equal to its
target, the central bank must raise unemployment to counter these shocks.
20After 1979, the Fed abandoned its former policy rule without committing to a new one
in a credible, public way. The public had to learn the new rule over time. While this learning
occurred, expectations were not “rational” in the sense of being consistent with the new rule. The
Fed had to incur costs to establish credibility. During inﬂation scares, it had to shock the economy
through unanticipated monetary contractions. The real-nominal tradeoffs of the Phillips curve occur
in establishing credibility but not in controlling inﬂation with credibility.
21 Consider oil price shocks. In early 1999, the price of a barrel of crude oil was around
$10. In March 2005, it reached $55. The unemployment rate, which fell from July 2003 onward,
did not provide an offset to this “inﬂation shock” in the last part of this period. As indicated by
the behavior of bond rates, ﬁnancial markets have not expected this increase in the relative price
of oil to increase inﬂation other than transitorily.
22 If the central bank had to respond directly to such price level changes, it could adversely
affect unemployment. The Friedman (1960) long-and-variable lag criticism of price level targeting
would apply. If the central bank maintains expected inﬂation equal to its target and then moves
the funds rate so that the real rate tracks the natural rate, money creation follows changes in
real money demand. Money is not an independent inﬂuence (see Section 4). If the central bank54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
level does not create an expectation of further inﬂation. Consequently, there
is no expectational coordinating mechanism to propagate a general price rise
(note generalization (4) of Section 1). As a consequence of central bank use
of an interest rate target as opposed to a money target, there is no real balance
effect to reverse the contemporaneous price rise, and the price level can drift.
However, over time, such changes tend to wash out.23
UnliketheLucasPhillipscurveoftheNewClassicalmodel(2),theCalvo-
Rotemberg Phillips curve of the New Keynesian model (3), which assumes
sticky(infrequentlychanged)prices,doesofferapredictabletradeoffbetween
real and nominal variables. However, even though the central bank can sys-
tematically exploit a tradeoff between real and nominal variables, it should
not. A policy of price stability is welfare maximizing because it avoids the
relative price distortions that inﬂation causes with intermittent price setting.24
With either type of Phillips curve, central bank control of inﬂation through
manipulation of the real-nominal correlations of the Phillips curve is not an
option, either because it is infeasible or because it is undesirable.
4. MONETARY CONTROL WITHAN INTEREST RATE
INSTRUMENT
If central bank control of inﬂation does not possess a characterization in terms
of manipulation of a Phillips curve relationship, it must possess a character-
ization in terms of monetary control. However, with central bank use of an
interest rate instrument, monetary control does not require a target for money.
An understanding of monetary control with an interest rate instrument
begins with the fact that the market interest rate comprises a nominal and a
real component. For each component, there is a unique value consistent with
maintaining inﬂation equal to target. Monetary policy must set the ﬁrst equal
to its inﬂation target and discover the value of the second to make it equal
the natural interest rate (the real interest rate that would prevail with complete
price ﬂexibility).
created and destroyed money to offset transitory movements in inﬂation, money creation would
become an independent inﬂuence with unpredictable results.
23 The forecast error associated with a prediction of the future price level can still grow
very large as the forecast horizon lengthens. If the central bank wanted to assure price stability
as opposed to inﬂation stability, it would need to establish credibility for a negative correlation
between actual inﬂation and expected inﬂation rather than just a zero correlation.
24 See Goodfriend and King (1997, 2001) and Wolman (2001). Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999, 74) state: “[E]ven though our proposed welfare criterion...assigns ultimate importance only
to the efﬁciency of the level of real activity..., it in fact justiﬁes giving complete priority to inﬂation
stabilization as opposed to output stabilization.”
King and Wolman (1999, 350) state: “[T]he monetary authority should...make the price level
the sole objective of monetary policy....[P]rice level stabilization policy is optimal in a very speciﬁc
sense: it maximizes utility of the representative individual.”R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 55
Thecentralbankmuststabilizethepublic’sexpectationof(trend)inﬂation
by following a rule that keeps that expectation equal to its inﬂation target.
Consider an inﬂation scare (Goodfriend 1993). To maintain expectational
credibility (the nominal anchor), the central bank must be willing to create an
unexpected negative output gap by imparting a monetary shock.25
Given equality between expected inﬂation and the central bank’s inﬂation
target, the central bank can take for granted stability in the inﬂation premium
in the interest rate. It can then vary its interest rate instrument to produce
predictable changes in the real rate. It can concentrate on the sole objective
of making the real interest rate track the natural interest rate. In doing so,
it allows the price system to maintain resource utilization at its natural level
(keep yt − y∗
t at zero). Real output grows in line with potential output.
Expected inﬂation then drives both actual inﬂation and money growth
beyond changes in real money demand, which the central bank accommo-
dates as a consequence of maintaining an interest rate peg. In a sense, there
is a Friedman k-percent rule for money growth, which equals the k-percent
inﬂation target plus whatever additional amount is required to accommodate
changes in real money demand. However, changes in nominal money rather
than changes in the price level provide the public with desired changes in real
money. The central bank provides for desired changes in real money (consis-
tent with the behavior of natural output) through changes in nominal money,
thereby obviating the need for price level changes (beyond those compatible
with the inﬂation target).
A policy rule that works poorly to maintain equality between the real and
natural interest rate engenders excess money creation (destruction). With a
policy rule that permits base drift in the price level, these monetary emissions
(absorptions)forcechangesinthepricelevel. Theyarethereal-worldcounter-
parts to the helicopter drop of money used by Friedman (1969) in expositions
of the quantity theory. Now, changes in the price level provide the public
with desired changes in real money. Although a central bank with an interest
rate instrument does not target money directly, to stabilize the price level it
must possess a rule that provides for monetary control in the sense that money
creation only accommodates prior changes in real money demand rather than
forcing changes in the price level.
One can use this deﬁnition of monetary control to understand FOMC
procedures. Because the FOMC does not possess observations of the natural
interest rate, it requires an indicator that registers misalignment between the
real and natural rate. Hetzel (2004a, 2005) argues that the FOMC uses a
growth gap indicator. It raises the funds rate when the economy is growing
faster than its estimated potential growth, and conversely.
25An ability to affect real variables through a monetary shock is different from controlling
real variables in a systematic manner.56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
From a different but equivalent perspective, Broaddus and Goodfriend
(2004)arguethatFOMCprocedurespreventemergenceofamarkupgap—the
difference between the markup and its natural or proﬁt maximizing value.26
When the gap falls, the FOMC raises the (real and nominal) funds rate to
restrain aggregate demand and restore the optimal output gap, and vice versa.
Because the FOMC does not observe the output gap, it requires an indicator.
The indicator is the degree of stress on resource utilization, which the FOMC
synthesizes from extensive review of economic statistics.
5. A REAL-WORLD HELICOPTER DROP OF MONEY
The language of economics is the language of tradeoffs. To use this language
to understand the implications of an inﬂation target requires a model. I use
the New Keynesian model to illustrate the control of inﬂation given that the
central bank does not ﬁnd it desirable to trade off inﬂation variability against
output variability. The model places the control of inﬂation in the context of
monetary control rather than manipulation of the real-nominal relationship of
a Phillips curve. (The appendix exposits the model.)
The intent of the simulation is to provide a real-world counterpart to the
exogenous increase in money assumed in expositions of the quantity theory.
In the simulation, a persistent productivity shock raises the natural interest
rate. Interest rate smoothing by the central bank causes the money stock to
rise. Although money is endogenous, the price level must rise to maintain real
money equal to the amount the public demands.27
With the policy rule (5), the nominal anchor is an inﬂation target. The
central bank responds to the difference between actual (π) and targeted inﬂa-
tion (πT). Changes in the interest rate (Rt) that the central bank sets exhibit
inertia relative to a base value R∗
t−1, which is the average of the prior period’s
actual interest rate and the interest rate in the absence of shocks (the steady














26 In a world of monopolistic competition, the markup is the difference between price and
marginal cost. Firms raise prices when they expect the markup to remain persistently below its
proﬁt maximizing value.
27 In his exposition of the quantity theory, Friedman (1969, 4) examines the consequences
of the following conceptual event: “[O]ne day a helicopter ﬂies over this community and drops
an additional $1,000 in bills from the sky.” In the simulation, the helicopter drop comes from
interest rate smoothing by the central bank at the time of a real disturbance that raises the natural
interest rate.R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 57
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Because of this interest rate smoothing, the interest rate set by the central
bank responds only with a lag to changes in the natural interest rate. That lag
causes money creation and ﬂuctuations in inﬂation around the inﬂation target.
The point is that inﬂation control requires both a credible inﬂation target and
procedures that vary the interest rate instrument so that it tracks the natural
interest rate.
By deﬁnition, a central bank is the organization with a monopoly on
the creation of the monetary base (money in the model). Consequently, a
relationshipwillexistbetweenthemonetarybaseandthecentralbank’spolicy
instrument, the interest rate. Equation (6) speciﬁes the relationship consistent
with (5):






The inﬂation target πT determines expected and actual trend inﬂation.
Money growth increases one for one with increases in πT.(  ln is the change
in the natural logarithm.) The interest rate peg causes changes in nominal
money to move with changes in the public’s demand for real money. The two
terms  lnct and v lnXt capture the effect of changes in real money demand
on nominal money. Under the assumption of an elasticity of demand for real
money with respect to real consumption (ct) of one, a 1 percent change in real
consumption produces a 1 percent change in nominal money. The v lnXt
term captures the effect on nominal money of changes in the opportunity cost58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly





, relates the interest
rate smoothing of the central bank to its money creation.29
The real disturbance is a technology shock that raises trend output (con-
sumption) growth from zero to 1 percent in period t.30 The natural (steady
statereal)interestraterisescommensuratelywiththegrowthrateofconsump-
tion. The price of contemporaneous consumption, the real interest rate, must
rise to reconcile the consumer to a pattern of consumption that now favors the
future. With an assumed rate of time preference β equal to 0.97125, before
the increase in productivity growth, the real interest rate is 3 percent. With an
inﬂationtargetπT of1percent,thenominalinterestrateis4percent. Afterthe
productivity shock raises the trend growth rate of consumption to 1 percent,
the trend nominal interest rate rises to 5 percent.
Figure 1 displays the behavior of the interest rate. In the initial period of
the productivity increase, the central bank limits the interest rate increase by
pulling the interest rate toward a base value (the average of the prior period’s
interest rate and the prior period’s steady state interest rate). In period t,
through money creation, the central bank keeps the interest rate at about 4.4
percent. A one-time increase in the nominal money stock of 1 percent occurs
about equally in periods t and t + 1 (Figures 2 and 3).
The increase in consumption increases the demand for real money while
the increase in the nominal interest rate decreases it. As a consequence of its
interest rate target, the central bank accommodates the net change in demand.
The situation is different for the money the central bank creates through its
interest rate smoothing. That money creation emerges as a consequence of
the central bank’s effort to resist the rise in the interest rate. The public must
adjust to it. Now, portfolio balance by the public requires a rise in the price
level commensurate with the rise in money. With no change in the price level,
there is an excess supply of money and an excess demand for bonds.31
The jump in real consumption in period t makes consumption in t high
relative to consumption in t + 1 (Figure 4). In t, despite the rise in trend
28 Xt = Rt
1+Rt · ct
wt . Xt measures percentage changes in real money demand from (22). Be-
cause ct and wt (the real wage) move together leaving the ratio unchanged, the Xt term measures
the change in the demand for money arising from changes in the interest rate, Rt.
The elasticity of the demand for real money with respect to the interest rate, υ, is set at
−0.038. The number is the estimate from Porter and Small (1989, 247) of the long-run elasticity
of money demand. They assume that the effect of a change in the opportunity cost of holding
money requires six quarters to work itself out fully. Because I assume that a period is one year,
the number used here is two-thirds of the number they estimate.
29 In the simulation, the interest rate smoothing parameter (s) equals 1.3.
30 In (26), at increases by one percentage point.
31 To see the need for portfolio rebalancing, consider the marginal return and cost for holding
money. The nominal interest rate is the cost for holding money. Equating the far left and far
right sides of (15) and rearranging yields (7), which expresses the interest rate as a price that
relates ﬂows to stocks (the ratio of the ﬂow of liquidity services from an additional dollar to the
discounted marginal value of an additional future dollar of resources):R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 59
Figure 2 Money





















Notes: Natural log of money.
Figure 3 Change in Money Due to Rate Smoothing

















Notes: The solid line shows the changes in each period due to interest rate smoothing.











The money creation from interest rate smoothing reduces the marginal beneﬁt from holding money.
The marginal value of real money—that is, the magnitude of h  (mtct)—declines. The return to
money then falls short of the return on bonds, Rt. The individual rebalances his/her portfolio
by attempting to move from money to bonds. Without a rise in the price level, this rebalancing
raises the yield on bonds. The fall in the bond yield stimulates consumption. Because of price
stickiness, increased nominal demand translates into increased real consumption (Figure 4).60 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Consumption










Notes: Natural log of consumption.
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Notes: This series shows the expected percent change in consumption, ln(Ct+1)−ln(Ct).
productivity growth, expected consumption growth is therefore negative (Fig-
ure 5), which temporarily restrains the rise in the interest rate.
Offsetting this negative inﬂuence is a rise in expected inﬂation above its
trend level of 1 percent. In t, the public expects in t + 1 an additional rise in
prices of 0.6 percent due to the catch-up price rises from ﬁrms whose price
setting was constrained in t (Figure 6). On net, in t, the interest rate rises
about 0.4 percent.
As shown by Figure 7, the money creation that arises out of interest rate
smoothing causes the price level to rise by 1 percent relative to trend. The
increase in money per unit of consumption is less because of the fall in the
demand for real money due to the increase in the bond rate and the accommo-R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 61
Figure 6 Expected Inﬂation


















Notes: This series shows the expected inﬂation, ln(Pt+1)−ln(Pt).


















Notes: Natural log of price level, normalized so that Pt−4 = 1. The solid line shows
the price level with interest rate smoothing. The dashed line shows it without interest
rate smoothing.
dationofthisfallindemandduetothecentralbank’sratepeg. Figure8shows
a fall in the ratio of the real money the public desires relative to consumption,
[Mt/(Ptct)]. Figure 9 shows the ratio of money per unit of consumption and
the price level. The 1 percent rise in the price level (relative to trend) requires
only a 0.2 percent rise in money per unit of consumption because of the 0.8
percent fall in the demand for money per unit of consumption.32
32 Note that the individual price setters cannot index the change in their dollar prices to the
money stock as protection against monetary disturbances. The relationship between money and62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Money Demand










Notes: Natural log of inverse of velocity, ln(m/(CP)), normalized so that ln(m/(CP))t−4
equals 1.
Figure 9 Money per Unit of Consumption and the Price Level










Notes: The solid line is the log of the price level; the dashed line is ln(M/C). Series
normalized so that ln(Pt − 4) and ln((M/C)t − 4) equal 1.
6. WHAT DIFFERENCE WOULDAN INFLATION TARGET
MAKE?
Goodfriend (2005) argues that an inﬂation target need not change the way that
the Fed operates because it already uses an implicit inﬂation target. His argu-
ment, however, does not address concerns of critics of an explicit target. They
argue that such explicitness might cause the Fed to abandon its dual mandate
prices is a complicated one that depends upon the behavior of the interest rate and real money
demand.R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 63
by reducing inﬂation variability by increasing output variability. However,
I argue here that the concern is misplaced. The control of inﬂation requires
monetary control rather than manipulation of output and unemployment in a
way constrained by the tradeoffs apparently offered by a Phillips curve.
An inﬂation target would require better communication with the public.
Like all institutions in a constitutional democracy, the long-run viability of
the Fed as an institution depends upon public support, which derives from
public understanding of its objectives and the procedures for achieving those
objectives. An inﬂation target possesses the potential for enhancing that un-
derstanding. However, the standard for communication becomes more de-
manding than it would in a world without explicit objectives. At present,
justiﬁcation of changes in the funds rate can rely on a commonsense appeal to
the contemporaneous behavior of the economy. In contrast, with an inﬂation
target, justiﬁcation of changes in the funds rate will derive from a need to
achieve the inﬂation target.
The difﬁculty of communication arises because the funds rate may need
to change in a counterintuitive way, given the behavior of inﬂation and the
inﬂationtarget. TheFedwillneedamodeltoexplaintherelationshipbetween
fundsratechangesandachievementofitsinﬂationobjective. Forexample,the
funds rate may need to change continually (to track the natural interest rate)
eventhoughinﬂationstaysontarget. Inthisevent,thepublicwillseeapositive
correlation between strength in real economic activity and the funds rate, but
no correlation between inﬂation and the funds rate. Despite appearances,
monetary policy is controlling inﬂation, not real growth.
Adoption of an inﬂation target is just one step on a longer journey of
making monetary policy procedures explicit. An inﬂation target is only the
starting point for full communication with the public. Clariﬁcation of its
implications for monetary policy requires speciﬁcation of the policy rule that
supportsit. Clariﬁcationofitsimplicationsforthetradeoffsrequiredtoachieve
it requires speciﬁcation of the structure of the economy (a model). Although
therequiredcommunicationwillbeintenseandchallenging,itwilladvancethe
communicationnecessaryforanyinstitutionthatispartofU.S.constitutional
democracy.64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
APPENDIX: THE MODEL
The model is from Wolman (1998).33 Equation (8) represents consumers’
preferences. The consumption aggregate is ct; leisure, lt; the discount rate, β;




βt · [ln(ct) + χ · lt]. (8)

















where the price level is Pt; the nominal money the consumer carries over into
t+1isMt; thequantityofone-periodnominalzero-couponbondsthatmature
in t + 1i sBt; the market interest rate on these bonds, Rt; the real wage, wt;
work time, nt; real dividend payments by ﬁrms, dt; and lump sum transfers of
money from the central bank, St.
The time constraint is
nt + lt + h[Mt/(Ptct)] = E, (10)
where E is the time endowment. Transactions time, h[Mt/(Ptct)], varies in-
versely with real money balances (liquidity services) measured as the fraction
of expenditures the consumer holds as money balances. With Mt/Pt = mt,
transactions time is h(mt/ct), ∂h/∂c > 0, and ∂h/∂m < 0.
1. CONSUMER CHOICEAND THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
Theindividualmaximizesutilitybychoosingct,lt,nt,Bt,andMt tomaximize
(8) subject to (9) and (10). The Lagrange multipliers on the latter two budget
constraints are, respectively, λt (the marginal utility value of an extra unit of
goods) and µt (the marginal utility value of time). The ﬁrst order conditions
are as follows:
33 For further exposition, see Wolman (1997, 1999, and 2001). For a deﬁnition of equilibrium,
see Wolman (1998). Goodfriend (2004a) provides an heuristic overview.
34 χ = 0.77 (Wolman 1998).R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 65
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ct







χ = µt, (12)
µt = wt · λt, (13)
λt
Pt






















According to (11), the individual equates the marginal value of consump-
tion, 1
ct ,withthemarginalvalueofrealresources,λt ,andthemarginalvalueof






. The marginal value
of time comes from (12). From (13), the individual allocates time between
laborandleisuretoequatethemarginalrateofsubstitutionbetweengoodsand
leisure, µt/λt, to the wage rate, wt. In (14),
λt
Pt measures the marginal utility
valueofanadditionaldollarofgoods. (Adoublingofthepricelevelhalvesthe
real value of a dollar of goods.) The gross rate of interest, (1 + Rt), equates
the marginal value of a dollar today with the discounted expected marginal
value of a dollar tomorrow.
The ﬁrst order condition (15) expresses the equality between the marginal
beneﬁts and costs of holding money.35 The utility value of the time gained
from holding an additional dollar equals −
µt





with h  (·) < 0. The
marginal cost of holding an additional dollar equals the marginal value of a
dollar of goods today minus the discounted value of the expected gain from





. From (14), the





beneﬁt of holding an additional dollar is measured for the current period and
the marginal cost, Rt, for the future period.
One can also make the measurement of marginal beneﬁt and cost compa-
rable by comparing the return from investing to the marginal cost.36 The gain
35 McCallum (1983) and McCallum and Goodfriend (1987) derive a money demand function
within the above optimizing framework.
36 The remainder of this section is from Wolman (1997, 6).66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in transactions time from holding an additional dollar is −h  (mt/ct) · 1
Ptct .
The value of an additional unit of time spent working when invested in a bond
is Pt · wt · (1 + Rt). The return to holding an additional dollar, therefore, is
−Pt · wt · (1 + Rt) · h  (mt/ct) · 1
Ptct . On the other hand, the cost of holding
an additional dollar is the interest forgone, Rt. Equating the marginal beneﬁt
and cost of liquidity services, after rearrangement, yields







Equation (17) is a particular functional form for h(·) that relates real
money balances inversely to transactions time:
h(mt,c t) = κ · (mt/ct)
−1
γ ,γ ∈ (0,1). (17)










,γ ∈ (0,1). (18)
With (18), real money becomes inﬁnite as the interest rate goes to zero.
A liquidity trap arises in that there is no point at which the public becomes
satiated with real money. However, a liquidity trap has never been observed.
For the case of Japan, see Hetzel (2003, 2004b) and, for the United States, see
Wolman (1997). Satiation is the empirically relevant case.37
In order to attain satiation, shopping time must cease falling at some ﬁ-
nite level of real money balances. This phenomenon cannot occur with (17)
because the function asymptotes to zero. However, adding a constant to h  (·)
makes h(·) cease falling and turn up at some point. At this point, satiation oc-
curs. That is, the public has no reason to hold additional real money balances.
Wolman (1997) reformulates (17) in this fashion: h  (mt/ct) = φ − (κ/γ) ·
(mt/ct)
−1−1/γ ,φ≥ 0. With ν ≡− γ/(1 + γ) and A ≡ (κ/γ)
−γ/(1+γ), then
h  (mt/ct) = φ − A−1/v · (mt/ct)
1/v with v<0,A>0. (19)
The transactions time function then becomes
37 The issue is important in dealing with the zero bound problem. If the market interest
rate falls to zero, the central bank can switch to a reserve aggregate target (Goodfriend 2000;
Hetzel 2003, 2004b). Money creation then exerts its inﬂuence on nominal expenditure through
portfolio rebalancing. One can see the power of this effect in the historical data during periods
when monetary policy procedures did not provide for monetary control. Nominal and real expen-
diture followed money creation, on average, with a two-quarter lag (Friedman and Schwartz 1963;
Friedman 1989).R. L. Hetzel: What Difference Would an Inﬂation Target Make? 67





v +   (20)
when mt/ct <A· φv and h(mt/ct) = h(Aφυ) =   + 1
1+vAφ1+υ when
mt/ct ≥ A · φν with   a nonnegative constant equal to the minimum amount
of shopping time. Shopping time decreases until real money balances reach
A · φv and then remains unchanged.
With (21), the expression for the equality of the marginal cost and beneﬁt
of holding money becomes







The public’s demand for money function then becomes38



















ε−1. Firms divide into two groups, which set their product
prices either in odd numbered or even numbered periods.39 Because all ﬁrms
face demand curves with constant elasticity ε, aggregate consumption equals

















where co,t and c1,t represent consumption in period t of goods with prices set,
respectively, in the current and previous period.






· ct with j = 0,1. (24)
P ∗
t−j is the time t price in dollars of the good with price set in period t − j.















The ﬁrms’production functions are
38 The following parameter values are from Wolman (1998): A = 0.017 and φ = 0.0014.
39 ε = 10 (Wolman 1998).68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
cj,t = at · nj,t, (26)
where nj,t is the amount of labor employed in period t by a ﬁrm that set its




· cj,t − wt · nj,t. (27)




maximizes the present discounted value of expected proﬁts (28) derived from





































The optimal price comes from differentiating (28) with respect to P ∗
t ,


























The ﬁrm sets its dollar price as a constant markup over the present dis-
counted value of a weighted average of the nominal marginal cost in the two
periods for which the price is ﬁxed. The weights on marginal cost in the
two periods are given by the fraction of marginal revenue contributed in the
particular period.
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